The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage by Schauer, Frederick
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 56 | Issue 4 Article 14
The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment
Coverage
Frederick Schauer
Copyright c 2015 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1613 (2015), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol56/iss4/14




INTRODUCTION: LOOKING FOR SPEECH IN ALL THE 
WRONG (?) PLACES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1614
I. ON COVERAGE AND PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1617
II. COVERAGE AND THE SUPREME COURT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1621
III. COVERAGE AND THE INCENTIVES OF LITIGATION . . . . . . . . 1624
IV. THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1631
CONCLUSION: THE RISKS OF DOCTRINAL DISTORTION . . . . . . . 1634
* David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia. This
Article was prepared for the William & Mary Law Review’s February 2014 Symposium on
“The Contemporary First Amendment: Freedom of Speech, Press, and Assembly.”
1613
1614 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1613
INTRODUCTION:
LOOKING FOR SPEECH IN ALL THE WRONG (?) PLACES
In recent years, litigants have claimed that the First Amend-
ment’s Free Speech Clause limits the ability of the Securities and
Exchange Commission to mandate financial disclosures,1 restricts
the power of regulatory agencies to compel disclosure of conflicts of
interest in the pharmaceutical industry,2 constrains the authority
of a state to prevent licensed therapists from using therapeutic
methods that have no scientific basis,3 and controls the prerogative
of a liquor control commission to prohibit anticompetitive franchise
agreements between retailers and wholesalers.4 Litigants have also
argued that the First Amendment protects erroneous bond and
credit ratings,5 prevents the seizure of computer equipment used in
unlawful gambling,6 shields tattoo parlors from health regulations,7
1. See Full Value Advisors, LLC v. SEC, 633 F.3d 1104, 1104-08 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding
that the First Amendment challenge to disclosure requirements for large investment
managers was not ripe for adjudication); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 11,
23 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting but not reaching the First Amendment challenge to the Dodd-Frank
Act’s requirements of disclosure of payments to foreign governments).
2. See Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 308-10, 316 (1st Cir. 2005)
(describing the First Amendment argument against compelled disclosure to a regulatory
agency but rejecting it as “completely without merit”).
3. See Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1051-57 (9th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, 740
F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the use of words in medical or therapeutic treatment
does not require heightened scrutiny of the regulation of treatment methods); see also Conant
v. Waters, 309 F.3d 629, 634-35 (9th Cir. 2002); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psycho-
analysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1053-56 (9th Cir. 2000).
4. See Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 5-10 (1st Cir. 2007)
(holding that agreements for advertising and other services do not constitute commercial
speech).
5. See Genesee Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Thornburg Mort. Sec. Trust, 825 F. Supp. 2d
1082, 1234-38 (D.N.M. 2011) (holding that credit ratings are not protected by the First
Amendment); Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor’s Fin. Servs., LLC, 813 F.
Supp. 2d 871, 877-78 & n.1 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (noting defendants’ First Amendment arguments,
but deciding case on other grounds), aff’d, 700 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2012); First Cmty. Bank v.
First Tenn. Bank, No. E2012-01422-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 4472514, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Aug. 20, 2013) (noting but not deciding First Amendment issue).
6. See Lucky Bob’s Internet Café, LLC v. Cal. Dep’t of Justice, No. 11-CV-148, 2013 WL
1849270, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. May 1, 2013) (rejecting claim that seizure of computer equipment
constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint). First Amendment arguments in opposition
to actions against unlawful gambling have also been raised and rejected in other cases. See,
e.g., There to Care, Inc. v. Ind. Dep’t of Revenue, 19 F.3d 1165, 1167-68 (7th Cir. 1994);
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prohibits the government from requiring employers to inform em-
ployees of their legal rights,8 limits legal sanctions for erroneous
maps and charts,9 guarantees the right of a citizen to warn potential
targets of a police sting operation that they are in jeopardy of
arrest,10 and, similarly, ensures that citizens are free to flash their
headlights in order to warn oncoming motorists of the presence of
police seeking to apprehend speeders.11
Not to be outdone by actual litigants in actual courts, authors of
law review articles and notes have recently argued that the First
Amendment encompasses the right to engage in sports12 and unpro-
tected sexual activity,13 immunizes auctioneers from the require-
ments of professional licensing,14 protects people who wish to make
deafeningly loud nonverbal noise in athletic arenas,15 and even
allows people to practice law without a license.16 And a veritable
Telesweeps of Butler Valley, Inc. v. Kelly, No. 3:12-CV-1374, 2012 WL 4839010, at *7-9 (M.D.
Pa. Oct. 10, 2012); Allied Veterans of the World, Inc.: Affiliate 67 v. Seminole Cnty., 783 F.
Supp. 2d 1197, 1202 (M.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d on other grounds, 468 Fed. Appx. 922, 923 (11th
Cir. 2012).
7. See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061-68 (9th Cir. 2010)
(invalidating a total prohibition of tattoo businesses); Coleman v. City of Mesa, 284 P.3d 863,
866-71 (Ariz. 2012) (upholding a health-based regulation of tattoo parlors). These cases are
discussed and analyzed in Clay Calvert, Fringes of Free Expression: Testing the Meaning of
“Speech” Amid Shifting Cultural Mores and Changing Technologies, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
545, 561-62 (2013).
8. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778, 797 n.20 (D.S.C. 2012)
(noting the First Amendment argument against required posting of employees’ legal rights,
but finding the First Amendment issues moot).
9. Google raised a First Amendment defense in Rosenberg v. Harwood, No. 100916536,
2011 WL 3153314 (D. Utah May 27, 2011), as described in Jeffrey Rosen, Keeping Google
Good: Remarks on Privacy Regulation and Free Speech, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1003, 1005-06
(2013), but the court did not address the issue.
10. City of Dayton v. Van Hoose, No. 18053, 2000 WL 1803867, at *1-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
8, 2000) (rejecting a First Amendment argument).
11. Elli v. City of Ellisville, 997 F. Supp. 2d 980, 983-84 (E.D. Mo. 2014) (granting a
preliminary injunction because plaintiff’s warning to other drivers constituted communication
protected by the First Amendment).
12. Genevieve Lakier, Sport as Speech, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1109, 1111 (2014).
13. Alexander S. Birkhold, Poking Holes in L.A.’s New Condom Requirement:
Pornography, Barebacking, and Speech, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1819, 1820 (2013).
14. See Enrique Armijo, “Going Once, Going Twice ...”: The Dubious Legality and Necessity
of North Carolina’s Auctioneer License Statute, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1887, 1927-34 (2013).
15. See Shane Kotlarsky, What’s All the Noise About: Did the New York Yankees Violate
Fans’ First Amendment Rights by Banning Vuvuzelas in Yankee Stadium?, 20 JEFFREY S.
MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 35, 36 (2013).
16. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Does Legalzoom Have First Amendment Rights?: Some
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industry has grown up around a diverse collection of claims that the
First Amendment’s protection extends to computer language, source
code, and raw data in all of its infinite varieties.17
What is most interesting about these various claims and argu-
ments is not merely that some of them have been taken seriously.18
Rather, it is that they have been advanced at all, in contrast to what
would have been expected a generation ago, when the suggestion
that the First Amendment was even applicable to some of these
activities would far more likely have produced judicial laughter or
incredulity, if not Rule 11 sanctions. Accordingly, if we seek to ex-
amine the changing nature of the First Amendment landscape, both
now and into the future, we might well train our attention not only
on the degree of protection (or not) for activities that have long been
taken to be at least relevant to the First Amendment, but also, and
perhaps even more, on those activities that only recently have been
thought to have anything to do with the First Amendment at all. In
the past, many of the most important issues surrounding the First
Amendment were issues about the nature and degree of its
protection within its widely acknowledged coverage.19 But now the
Thoughts About Freedom of Speech and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 20 TEMPLE POL.
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 255, 257 (2011).
17. See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60 (2014); Stuart Minor
Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1447 (2013); Oren Bracha, The
Folklore of Informationalism: The Case of Search Engine Speech, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629,
1630 (2014); Gerard J. Clark, The Constitutional Protection of Information in a Digital Age,
47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 267, 269 (2014); James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 868, 933 (2014). But see Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1497 (2013).
Also relevant is Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011), invalidating a
content-based restriction on data mining.
18. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative, & “ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d
742, 826-27 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that credit ratings are covered by the First Amendment).
Compare Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 309 (1st Cir. 2005) (evaluating the
pharmaceutical conflict of interest mandatory disclosure requirement according to First
Amendment commercial speech standards), with id. at 316 (Boudin, J., concurring) (writing,
for a 2-1 majority on this point that the First Amendment claim was “completely without
merit”). See also cases cited supra note 7.
19. For example, although courts and scholars debated whether speech urging revolution
or other large-scale governmental change should be evaluated according to whether it
presented a clear and present danger, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48 (1919), a bad
tendency, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 671 (1925), an expected disvalue of danger in
excess of its free speech value, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951), a call to
action as opposed to belief, Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 330 (1957), or an imminent
likelihood of lawlessness, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), the claim that such
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pressure appears to be on coverage itself, with what seems to be an
accelerating attempt to widen the scope of First Amendment
coverage to include actions and events traditionally thought to be
far removed from any plausible conception of the purposes of a prin-
ciple of free speech. The goal of this Article is in part to document
this outward pressure on the First Amendment’s boundaries of
applicability, but even more to offer some hypotheses about why this
phenomenon appears to be occurring.
I. ON COVERAGE AND PROTECTION
In order to understand the question of coverage and to appreciate
its importance, it is necessary to distinguish the idea of coverage
from that of protection. But because I have been writing about (harp-
ing on?) this distinction for more than thirty years,20 I will keep the
recapitulation mercifully brief.
Like any other rule,21 the First Amendment22 does not regulate
the full range of human behavior. Rather, the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment23 has a scope of application, and it is that
speech had nothing to do with the First Amendment was rare. For a valuable summary of the
foregoing line of cases, see Frank Strong, Fifty Years of “Clear and Present Danger”: From
Schenck to Brandenburg—and Beyond, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 42-45.
20. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982);
Frederick Schauer, Can Rights Be Abused?, 31 PHIL. Q. 225, 227 (1981); Frederick Schauer,
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 281 (1981)
[hereinafter Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment]; Frederick Schauer, Codifying the
First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 285, 287 [hereinafter Schauer,
Codifying the First Amendment]; Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment:
A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004)
[hereinafter Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment]. I will take credit for the labels
“coverage” and “protection,” but the basic idea was noted earlier in, for example, Laurent B.
Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1443 (1962) (distinguishing
the “scope” of the First Amendment from its “strength”); and Harry Kalven, Jr., The
Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267,
278 (distinguishing the “ambit” of the First Amendment from its “level” of protection).
21. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 23-24 (1991)
(distinguishing the factual predicate of a rule from its consequent).
22. On the rule-like character of the First Amendment, see generally Frederick Schauer,
The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1989).
23. In this article I will use “First Amendment” as shorthand for “Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment,” although some themes here may well be applicable to other parts of
the First Amendment and, even more broadly, to other parts of the Constitution.
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scope of application that we can designate as its “coverage.” When
an act (whether a regulatory act of government or a communicative
or expressive act of a speaker) is held to implicate the First Amend-
ment—when a First Amendment-inspired test or standard of review
applies—the act can be considered to be covered by the First
Amendment. Conversely, when the First Amendment does not even
apply—when a restriction is ordinarily evaluated only in accordance
with a rational basis standard24—we can say that the activity is
uncovered. 
In many contexts, the distinction between the coverage of a rule
and its degree of protection (or its other consequences) is so straight-
forward as to be invisible. Typically, we look to the language of a
rule to determine its coverage, and that is why the coverage of the
Eighth Amendment is largely delineated by the word “punish-
ment,”25 why the coverage of the Second Amendment is close to the
common definition of the word “arms,”26 and why the requirement
24. The absence of heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment does not mean that
heightened scrutiny might not be applicable under some other constitutional provision. The
statement in the text thus presupposes the common situation in which the First Amendment
is the only available basis for heightened scrutiny, and thus that the absence of First
Amendment scrutiny produces only the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis standard. And
I take the rational basis standard as setting the (very low) baseline criterion for the
constitutionality of any governmental action. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 303-04 (1976) (holding that the preference for established pushcart vendors over newer
ones meets standard of minimal rationality); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963)
(rejecting on rational basis grounds a due process challenge to a law barring all except
lawyers from the business of debt adjusting); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483,
491 (1955) (rejecting on rational basis grounds due process and equal protection challenges
to a law prohibiting opticians from fitting eyeglasses without a prescription from an
optometrist or ophthalmologist); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)
(stating that states act within “extremely broad limits” in areas not infringing particular
constitutional rights). On the rational basis standard as establishing the degree of scrutiny
for even words and images that lie outside of the coverage of the First Amendment, see Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (relying on Ferguson and other rational basis
cases to permit regulation of obscenity on the basis of  “unprovable assumptions”). But in some
contexts the foregoing analysis may turn out to be an oversimplification, as in R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding that even the regulation of uncovered fighting
words must avoid viewpoint discrimination).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see generally Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Shall Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Be Inflicted”: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. II; cf. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 589 n.11 (2008)
(stressing literal meaning in interpreting the Second Amendment).
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of two witnesses for conviction in Article III, Section 3 applies to
trials for treason but not for other crimes.27
When we turn to the First Amendment, however, things are not
nearly so straightforward. If the coverage of the First Amendment
were even close to the ordinary meaning of the word “speech,” then
vast segments of human life would remain shielded by the First
Amendment from regulation or other legal consequences. To provide
just a few examples, the laws dealing with contracts, wills, trusts,
gambling, warranties, and fraud all involve legal regimes that
specify consequences, including negative ones, for using certain
words—speech—in certain ways, but routinely present no First
Amendment issues whatsoever. Moreover, a large portion of what
is now taken to be uncontroversially covered by the First Amend-
ment would become uncovered, including painting,28 sculpture,29
music,30 the wearing of armbands,31 and the display32 or desecra-
tion33 of flags, none of which involve speech in the ordinary sense of
that word. And thus whether we travel by the route of distinguish-
ing “the freedom of speech” from “speech” as the specification of cov-
erage;34 whether we understand “speech” as a term of art;35 whether
we look more directly at the underlying purpose or purposes of the
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; see United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir.
1986) (distinguishing treason from other crimes in rejecting a Treason Clause argument).
28. The First Amendment coverage of art is sometimes assumed without argument. E.g.,
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 589 (1998) (accepting that art is
“speech” for First Amendment purposes); Piarowski v. Illinois Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d
625, 628 (7th Cir. 1985) (observing that the First Amendment “embraces” the “purely
artistic”). See generally Randall P. Bezanson, Art and the Constitution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1593
(2008); Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169 (2012).
29. See Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1048 (2d Cir. 1988) (allowing
removal of government-owned sculptures against a First Amendment objection, but agreeing
that sculpture in general is protected by the First Amendment).
30. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos. Inc., 515 U.S 557, 569
(1995) (describing music as “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment).
31. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
32. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
33. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 399 (1989).
34. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 255.
35. See Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of Speech, 1993
WIS. L. REV. 1525, 1543.
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speech, press, assembly, and petition clauses;36 or whether we look
at the history of the First Amendment,37 we find ourselves in the
position of attempting to locate the coverage of the First Amend-
ment by means other than the ordinary language meaning of the
word “speech.” 
The question of coverage is thus an essential element in deter-
mining, for example, when the highest degree of First Amendment
protection applies,38 when the somewhat lower levels of intermedi-
ate scrutiny apply,39 and when no heightened scrutiny applies at
all.40 We know that heightened scrutiny applies to the punishment
36. On the necessity of looking to purpose rather than ordinary language, see Schauer,
Categories and the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 269; Frederick Schauer, Speech and
“Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional
Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 909 (1979).
37. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2751 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the First Amendment should be interpreted according to the
“practices and beliefs of the founding generation”). Recently the Supreme Court has suggested
that coverage is to be determined largely by history and tradition, and that exclusions from
coverage that are not in some way historically grounded would be disfavored. See, e.g., id. at
2734-38 (majority opinion) (holding that interactive video games are covered by the First
Amendment); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (holding that videos of
animal cruelty are covered because of lack of tradition of excluding violence from First
Amendment coverage). But the Court has never suggested that the ordinary meaning of the
word “speech” ought to be the touchstone for determining coverage.
38. Actually, “degrees” might be a better way of putting it, because there is some space
between the extremely high degree of protection offered by the test in Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969), and the arguably even higher degree of protection against prior
restraints. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint,
92 YALE L.J. 409, 417 (1983) (describing the prior restraint standard as an “independent rule
of constitutional disfavor”).
39. Again, there may be multiple levels of lower-but-more-than-rational-basis scrutiny.
The most familiar is the so-called intermediate scrutiny test applied to the regulation of
commercial advertising in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission
of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 556 (1980), and another is the standard from United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), and Clark v. Community Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 298 (1984), this being the standard applied to laws not aimed at the communicative
impact of an utterance but which nevertheless have an incidental effect on speech. On the
actual degree of scrutiny applied to such incidental restrictions on speech, see generally Larry
Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulation of Speech and Free Speech Theory,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (1993); Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Restrictions on Fundamental Rights,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1175 (1996); Frederick Schauer, Cuban Books, Cuban Cigars, and the
Problem of Incidental Restrictions on Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779 (1985);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987); Monica Youn,
The Chilling Effect and the Problem of Private Action, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1473, 1484-85 (2013).
40. As, for example, the ordinary, garden-variety case of aiding and abetting a crime, such
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of speeches urging the overthrow of the government,41 that interme-
diate scrutiny applies to the regulation of advertisements for
products,42 and that nothing more than rational basis scrutiny
applies to the legal control of the ordinary terms of an ordinary
contract, to the words used to enter into an agreement to fix prices,
and to the words used to perform an act of racial discrimination.
And we know all of this precisely because, sometimes explicitly and
sometimes not, we have made a largely purpose-based determina-
tion regarding the scope of coverage of the First Amendment.
II. COVERAGE AND THE SUPREME COURT
Historically, coverage questions explicitly addressed by the
Supreme Court have been focused largely on four domains. Obscene
materials were explicitly held to be uncovered in Roth v. United
States,43 a holding which was explicitly reaffirmed in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton,44 and which is seemingly still good law.45 Libel-
ous utterances were identified as uncovered in Beauharnais v.
Illinois,46 but it is clear that Beauharnais does not survive New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan47 and the corpus of doctrine it has spawned.48
as the case in which Smith tells Jones that Brown keeps his diamond jewelry in a safe behind
the mirror in the second floor bedroom, and that the safe has combination 36 left, 17 right,
24 left. See generally KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989)
(exploring the differences between the criminal speech that is covered by the First
Amendment and the criminal speech that is not).
41. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (interpreting—or, more accur-
ately, reinterpreting—Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961)); Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203, 211 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 313 (1957); and Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 513 (1951)).
42. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 567 (2001); 44 Liquormart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co., 447 U.S. at 566.
43. 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
44. 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973).
45. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 555 (1993) (noting and not challenging
the previous rejection of arguments for the unconstitutionality of obscenity regulation). A
range of technological and political developments have all but made adult obscenity (as op-
posed to child pornography) prosecutions obsolete, thus lessening the likelihood of constitu-
tional challenges to the basic Roth/Paris approach.
46. 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
47. 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964).
48. E.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976) (refining the definition of public
figure); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding the First Amendment
applicable to media defamation of private individuals); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
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Commercial advertising was treated as outside the First Amend-
ment in Valentine v. Chrestensen,49 a decision rendered obsolete by
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.50 And although the Court’s most famous statement
about noncoverage appeared in the context of the exclusion of fight-
ing words in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,51 subsequent cases52
have cast doubt on the importance of that conclusion even though
the nominal noncoverage of fighting words remains in place.53 
Although none of the developments in the previous paragraph are
new, a series of recent cases has brought the question of First
Amendment coverage back to the forefront of the Supreme Court’s
attention.54 Most important is United States v. Stevens,55 in which
the Court was asked to deem photographic depictions of actual tor-
ture of actual animals as outside the coverage of the First Amend-
ment, and thus to be treated in the same manner as nonobscene
child pornography after New York v. Ferber.56 Under the not-quite-
clear assumption that child pornography is genuinely noncovered,
and thus to be treated as no more relevant to the First Amendment
than verbal pricefixing or written consumer fraud, the Court, with
Chief Justice Roberts writing for the majority, described the
question explicitly in terms of “coverage”57 and refused to accept the
130, 155 (1967) (extending Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, to public figures). The Supreme Court is
not entirely clear on the point, but it is possible that nonmedia defamation of private
individuals remains entirely uncovered by the First Amendment, and that states are free to
regulate such defamation on the basis of common law rules untouched by Sullivan and
subsequent First Amendment cases. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985).
49. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
50. 425 U.S. 748, 759 (1976).
51. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words.” (footnote omitted)).
52. E.g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408
U.S. 901, 903-05 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972).
53. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992).
54. See Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 83.
55. 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
56. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
57. The Supreme Court’s assertion in Ferber that New York had a “compelling interest”
in protecting participant children against the harms of child pornography, Ferber, 458 U.S.
at 761, leaves open the possibility that child pornography is “covered” but not “protected.” See
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invitation to extend the First Amendment’s noncoverage of certain
film and similar images to depictions of animal cruelty.58 Defini-
tively rejecting the idea that coverage is determined by weighing the
value of a category of speech against its harm, the Court neverthe-
less kept open the theoretical possibility of identifying new cate-
gories of uncovered speech.59 Yet the Court also made clear that
such a possibility was far more theoretical than real, and indicated
that it would not look kindly on efforts to expand the categories of
uncovered speech.60
A year later, the Court again explicitly confronted the coverage
question, this time in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Associa-
tion, a case invalidating California’s efforts to restrict minors’ access
to violent interactive video games.61 The issue was again argued in
coverage terms, with California arguing that the category of ex-
treme violence, when offered to minors in an interactive setting,
should be treated in the same manner as obscenity and thus subject
only to rational basis review.62 In rejecting the argument for noncov-
erage, Justice Scalia, writing for a five-member majority,63 was even
more blunt than the Stevens Court, insisting that new and not his-
torically recognized categories of noncoverage were highly disfa-
vored, and that recognizing or creating new ones would require a
showing of necessity resembling the Court’s traditionally highly
stringent “compelling interest” standard.64
Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 286.
58. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470.
59. See id. at 470-72. The idea that coverage should be determined by balancing speech
value against harm comes from Chaplinsky, in which the Court stated that fighting words
“are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S.
568. The theoretical development of what has since come to be called “definitional balancing”
is principally attributable to Melville Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 967
(1968); and see also Melville Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First
Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 45 (1973).
60. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472.
61. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741 (2011).
62. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2734-35.
63. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito concurred only in the result, with Justices
Thomas and Breyer dissenting. Id.
64. Id. at 2734-38.
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Stevens and Entertainment Merchants taken together might be
understood to create a strong presumption of coverage. Indeed, the
tenor of both cases—especially the focus on historically recognized
exclusions—might even be thought to provide doctrinal ammunition
for those who would have the Court rethink the vast areas of hith-
erto invisible noncoverage. And if this Article were an exercise in
criticism of Supreme Court opinions, it might well explore Stevens
and Entertainment Merchants in just this way, wondering whether
the Court truly meant to be potentially receptive to First Amend-
ment challenges to most of the Securities Act of 1933,65 to many of
the applications of the Sherman Antitrust Act,66 and to the garden-
variety operation of the law of contracts, trusts, wills, warranties,
fraud, evidence,67 criminal solicitation,68 and criminal conspiracy,
among others. But this is not that article. Rather, it is principally
a highly preliminary exploration into the politics, psychology, and
sociology of coverage, an exploration that makes, as we shall see,
the Stevens and Entertainment Merchants language especially
important.69
III. COVERAGE AND THE INCENTIVES OF LITIGATION
As the traditional lawyer’s adage goes, if you don’t have the law
on your side, “argue the facts”, and if you don’t have the facts on
your side, “argue the law.”70 Behind this adage is the basic idea that
litigation is strategic, with good lawyers, who of course ordinarily do
not get to choose which side they will be on, seeking to locate the
forms of argument that will give them the best chance of prevailing.
65. The claims to that effect have been around for quite some time. See, e.g., Lloyd L.
Drury, III, Disclosure Is Speech: Imposing Meaningful First Amendment Constraints on SEC
Regulatory Authority, 58 S.C. L. REV. 757, 765 (2007); Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities
Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223, 225 (1990); Antony Page, Taking
Stock of the First Amendment’s Application to Securities Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 789, 790
(2007).
66. Cf. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990).
67. See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 705, 710 (2004).
68. See generally GREENAWALT, supra note 40.
69. My own more complete analysis of this and other dimensions of Stevens and
Entertainment Merchants is in Schauer, supra note 54.
70.  See, e.g., Andrew T. Savage, For the Plaintiffs, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 17, 2001, at A21.
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Seen from this perspective, lawyering in general is opportunistic,
and necessarily and properly so. Putting aside that segment of
“cause lawyering” that is often and justifiably concerned primarily
with establishing larger principles that will apply in future cases,
rather than seeking to maximize the likelihood of success for an
individual litigant in an individual case,71 most lawyers who raise
constitutional claims or defenses do so not out of their own commit-
ment to certain constitutional principles, but rather because they
believe that the constitutional argument will increase their likeli-
hood of winning. And in general, the same holds true of their
clients.72 In most instances, clients, especially non-repeat-player
clients, would prefer to win with whatever legal means are available.
From this perspective of litigation strategy, it is useful to consider
the circumstances in which many claims lying on the edge of First
Amendment coverage arise. For example, the plaintiffs in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc. were plainly interested in lower prices as well as in blocking the
anticompetitive tactics of nonchain local pharmacies, but there was
no indication that they had any intrinsic interest in expanding First
Amendment coverage.73 Had First Amendment doctrine been less
71. I put aside as beyond my concern here, and in fact beyond my competence in general,
the ethical quandaries presented by potential conflicts between the interests of particular
litigants in particular cases and the interests of the larger cause that a particular litigant’s
attorney may also represent.
72. When I was in law school, I took a course from the late Leonard Boudin, probably the
premier civil liberties lawyer of the 1950s and 1960s and the attorney who defended Dr.
Benjamin Spock against (pre-Brandenburg v. Ohio) charges of advocacy of draft evasion. After
a jury conviction in federal court, the First Circuit reversed, holding in part that giving a jury
special questions in a criminal case was a violation of Spock’s due process right to a general
verdict. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180-83 (1st Cir. 1969). Although the result
produced legal freedom for Spock and the court was plainly highly sympathetic to Spock’s
First Amendment claims, Boudin reported that an incensed Spock believed that Boudin
betrayed him by arguing a “technicality” rather than relying solely on arguments about the
illegality of the Vietnam War, the draft, or the prosecution of an individual for advocating
draft resistance. I suspect that Spock, believing it likely that his reputation (he was that Dr.
Spock) would have kept him from incarceration, would have preferred to lose on his preferred
grounds than to win on Boudin’s sound but less grandly moral legal argument.
73. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 767-68
(1976). Indeed, as an organization primarily concerned with the well-being of retail consu-
mers, it is ironically likely that the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council would have been
sympathetic to the regulation of misleading advertising—just the kind of regulation that is
more vulnerable to challenge after Virginia Pharmacy than it was prior to that decision.
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robust in general, had cases like Bigelow v. Virginia74 and perhaps
even Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission75 not laid
the foundation for protection of commercial advertisements as free
speech, and had Lochner v. New York76 retained more vitality,77
Virginia Pharmacy would have been argued and even decided on
substantive due process rather than free speech grounds.78 Simi-
larly, those who object on nominally First Amendment grounds to
mandatory disclosure in securities transactions79 and pharmaceuti-
cal marketing80 are likely to be far less concerned with free speech
as a principle and far more with the economic effects of such
mandated disclosure on their business practices. And even those
who have—more conventionally in light of traditional First Amend-
ment issues—relied on the First Amendment to protect various
aspects of the sex business have often done so precisely because the
First Amendment gives them the greatest likelihood of protecting
their businesses and profits from regulatory attack. Indeed, a good
example of this explanation came in the 2005 case United States v.
74. 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (invalidating a restriction on abortion advertising on First
Amendment grounds).
75. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)
(upholding a restriction on gender-separate employment advertisements). Although Pitts-
burgh Press upheld the restriction, the Court took the First Amendment arguments to the
contrary seriously, and the four dissenters individually made clear that they would have
reached the opposite conclusion on freedom of the press grounds. Id. at 393 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 397 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 404
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
76. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
77. Lochner’s reputation has been somewhat rehabilitated in recent years. See, e.g.,
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 222
(2004); DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 125 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 873, 874-75 (1987). In 1976, however, it was widely accepted that arguing against
business regulation on economic liberty grounds would have been a hopeless strategy. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965) (emphasizing that Lochner-style review
of state legislation is an unacceptable general approach); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
730 (1963) (describing Lochner as having been “discarded”); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236,
246 (1941) (making clear that Lochner was no longer good law). Famously, the nonviability
of Lochner is also the running and endorsed theme of JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73 (1980).
78. Indeed, an influential analysis argues that that is exactly what the Court
disingenuously did. Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech:
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1979).
79. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Extreme Associates.81 There, the defendant, a distributor of poten-
tially legally obscene materials, seized on Justice Scalia’s dissenting
characterization of the holding in Lawrence v. Texas82 to argue that
obscenity regulation was a restriction on sexual liberty that could
not survive due process scrutiny after Lawrence.83 The argument
was an odd reversal of the more conventional use of the First
Amendment when liberty/due process arguments are likely to be
unavailing, as in Virginia Pharmacy. By contrast, in Extreme Assoc-
iates, the claims that would historically have been couched in the
language of free speech and the First Amendment were recast as
seemingly more viable (at least post-Lawrence) substantive due
process arguments because the First Amendment arguments looked
precedentially tenuous.
I have discussed this phenomenon on earlier occasions under the
label of “First Amendment opportunism;”84 but several events make
the topic timely and arguably more important now. First, the lan-
guage in Stevens and Entertainment Merchants provides additional
support for those who would want to make First Amendment argu-
ments for the protection of activities not traditionally or historically
thought of as at the center of the First Amendment. As noted above,
it may not be plausible to think that the Court in these cases
genuinely intended to create a presumption in favor of First Amend-
ment coverage for the entire universe of linguistic (or pictorial or
informational or communicative) activity.85 But that is what the
Court, especially in Stevens, with its new emphasis on what seems
to be a presumption of coverage unless there is a “long-settled
81. 352 F. Supp. 2d 578 (W.D. Pa. 2005), rev’d, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005).
82. 539 U.S. 558, 589-90 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 586, 590. For an article expanding on the
arguments made in that case by one of the attorneys for Extreme Associates, see Jennifer M.
Kinsley, Sexual Privacy in the Internet Age: How Substantive Due Process Protects Online
Obscenity, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 103, 118-20 (2013).
84. See generally, Frederick Schauer, Free Speech Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT:
FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002);
Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW 347 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) [hereinafter
Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment]; see also Schauer, The Boundaries of the First
Amendment, supra note 20, at 1787-1800 (describing the consequences of the “magnetism” of
the First Amendment).
85. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
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tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation,”86 might be
understood as saying. Other interpretations of the relevant lan-
guage might be possible, and it may be that most of the traditional
exclusions from coverage would satisfy the Court’s approach and
thus remain excluded. But some might not because certain forms of
regulation—for example, securities laws and control of uninten-
tionally inaccurate labeling information—are of relatively recent
vintage, at least compared to the age of the First Amendment itself.
And even if many of the traditional exclusions might ultimately re-
main excluded, some might not, simply because of the way in which
the Court’s language in both Stevens and Entertainment Merchants
seems to place the burden of proof or burden of persuasion on those
who would argue for an exclusion.87 If it is correct that what the
Supreme Court says is far more important than what it holds, as
David Klein and Neal Devins have recently documented,88 then we
can see at least some of the language in these two recent cases as
empowering a wide range of new challenges to previously uncovered
activity. When one advocate can quote, and not plainly out of con-
text, from the exact words of a Supreme Court opinion, and when
her opponent is left to argue that what was initially quoted by her
adversary is not what the Court really meant, or that the quoted
language is mere dicta, the experienced advocate will know that the
former has the upper hand and the latter is on the defensive. 
Stevens and Entertainment Merchants merely provide new oppor-
tunities for a phenomenon that is fueled from other sources as well.
Now that First Amendment arguments come as much, if not more,
from the political right as from the political left,89 the likelihood that
free speech arguments will find a sympathetic audience has in-
creased—whether on the bench, in political domains, or in public
86. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011).
87. See Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729; Stevens, 559 U.S. 460.
88. David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court
Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2049-50 (2013); see also FREDERICK SCHAUER,
THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 180-81 (2009);
Frederick Schauer, Private Speech and the Private Forum: Givhan v. Western Line School
District, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 217.
89. This phenomenon is documented in J.M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal
Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 376; and Frederick Schauer,
The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 935, 957 (1993).
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debate.90 The opportunistic lawyer or client seeking a way of fight-
ing against some form of regulation or prosecution can now have
increased confidence that an argument from the First Amendment
will not be received with political scorn or doctrinal incredulity. 
It is important to recognize that doctrinal victories often spring
from doctrinal losses. As Sandy Levinson observed in what seems
like a generation ago, the real question is not so much about which
arguments will prevail as it is about which arguments will be treat-
ed as “off the wall,” frivolous, or ridiculous, and which arguments
will not.91 Once an argument is taken seriously and moves out of the
category of being the subject of judicial or public or academic ridi-
cule, the argument has gone some way towards ultimate acceptance.
Not every argument that is taken seriously will prevail in the long
run, of course. But being taken seriously even in losing often seems
causal of being advanced on future occasions, causal of being taken
even more seriously on future occasions, and thus causal, in a
probabilistic sense, of finally being accepted. That is why it is
plausible to suppose that the Supreme Court’s refusal to say
anything about free speech in its opinion in the verbal workplace
sexual harassment case of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., despite
the First Amendment arguments made in some of the briefs and
some portion of the oral argument, is a more definitive statement of
90. There are two ways to understand this claim. One is that the increased receptiveness
to First Amendment claims by jurists on the political right as well as on the left means that
there is no longer any reason to suspect—as there might have been a generation ago—that
free speech arguments will be well received primarily on the political left. As a result, a vastly
higher proportion of the judiciary seems now open to such arguments, increasing the
likelihood of their success. Alternatively, it may be that the political valence of free speech
arguments has shifted even more dramatically, such that the arguments are now understood
as conservative rather than as liberal ones. If this alternative explanation is plausible, as the
recent decisions on campaign finance reform, for example, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct.
1434 (2014), and abortion clinic protests, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014), suggest,
then the field of receptiveness of First Amendment arguments may be changing even more
dramatically and opening up new opportunities for strategic use of the First Amendment.
91. Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 388 (1982) (crediting the
“off the wall/on the wall” idea in interpretation to Stanley Fish and adapting it to legal
interpretation); Sanford Levinson, What Do Lawyers Know? (And What Do They Do with Their
Knowledge?): Comments on Schauer and Moore, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 441, 442 (1985); see also
J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963,
967 (1998); Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?, 24
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 378 (1986).
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rejection of such claims than explicit discussion of them in the
opinion would have been.92
That constitutional arguments are strategic and opportunistic is
hardly surprising. That is simply what good lawyers are paid to do.
What may be slightly more surprising, especially to international
observers, is that in the United States, these arguments are seem-
ingly disproportionately focused on free speech and the First
Amendment. An interesting comparative project would attempt to
determine whether, for example, Canadian lawyers and clients
opportunistically seize on Charter-based equality arguments93 in the
same way that American lawyers and their clients seize on First
Amendment-based free speech arguments, at least on the assump-
tion that equality has the kind of political, cultural, and legal
resonance in Canada that free speech has in the United States.
Similarly, we can ask whether we see a similar phenomenon in Ger-
many, with the culturally important and constitutionally specified
right to dignity and right of personality94 emerging as the principle
of choice rather than equality, freedom of speech, or personal lib-
erty.
Equally important is the effect of free speech opportunism on the
development of First Amendment doctrine. It is one thing to say
that lawyers are acting properly, which they are, in seizing on the
First Amendment to maximize the likelihood of their clients’ suc-
cess. It is another thing entirely, however, to believe that such
opportunism, or the clash of opportunisms, will produce the best
overall doctrinal structure or the most theoretically and practically
sound doctrine. If one believes, with Lord Mansfield, that the com-
mon law “works itself pure,” then perhaps the consequences of free
speech opportunism can be expected, in the long term, to be for the
best.95 But if, on the other hand, there are reasons to believe that
92. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). The Court’s nondiscussion of the First Amendment issues in
Harris is criticized in Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the
First Amendment Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1, and defended in Schauer,
The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, supra note 84, at 359-60.
93. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11 (U.K.).
94. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC
LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl I, II (Ger.).
95. Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch.) 22-23, 1 Atk. 21, 33 (emphasis
omitted).
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client-centered and case-based litigation may not be the optimal
method of developing larger principles of general application,96 then
there is reason to question whether the First Amendment doctrine
produced by opportunistic behavior is necessarily or even likely to
be the First Amendment doctrine that is produced by methods less
dependent on the vagaries and incentives of particular clients,
particular lawyers, and particular litigation strategies.
IV. THE FUTURE
In the world of law schools and legal scholarship, it seems often
to be thought that legal arguments grow out of previous legal
arguments and decisions, and that legal doctrine is, at least to some
extent, self-generating. And I suspect that a quick scan through
most (but not all) casebooks would provide much support for this
understanding of the growth of the law. But even though it is almost
certainly true that existing or emerging legal doctrine plays some
causal role in determining which legal arguments will be advanced
and which will not, it is a mistake to assume that prior doctrine is
the only or even principal causal agent in explaining which legal
doctrines are used by whom and when.97 Legal arguments are made
96. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006)
(arguing that the nature of the case selection process may produce case-based principles
which are suboptimal for the full array of events to which the principles will apply). For a
similar argument with greater focus on economic theories of case selection and legal evolution,
see Gillian Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 615-16 (1992).
Analyses more sympathetic to Lord Mansfield’s basic point, recast in modern economic terms,
include John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 393, 394 (1978); and Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 51, 61 (1977). For analyses advancing more mixed conclusions, see William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 279 (1979); and
Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551, 1552-53 (2003). Obviously it is not my purpose here to resolve these
long-standing debates about the efficiency of common law approaches to legal change and the
creation of legal rules. But it is nonetheless important to point out that any inference from
the phenomenon of First Amendment opportunism to the desirability of the legal rules
produced by an opportunistic process requires taking a strong position on the desirability of
a litigation-centered process as a way of achieving the soundest legal regimes—a position that
is, at the very least, open to debate.
97. My claim here is plainly in the neighborhood of Holmes’s famous assertion that “[t]he
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.” O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON
LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881). If one way of understanding Holmes is that he was
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because lawyers make them, and lawyers make them because it is
in the interest of their individual or institutional clients to have
them made. But clients are typically not interested in legal doctrine
or in developing legal principles nearly as much as they are
interested in winning. And thus a significant causal influence on the
development of legal doctrine has always been the arguments that
lawyers see as the ones that will give their doctrine-uninterested
clients the best chance of prevailing.
The question then shifts, as many of the Legal Realists took pains
to emphasize, to what it is that leads lawyers to believe that some
arguments will be more likely to succeed than others.98 In some
areas of law, this may be largely a function of doctrine in the nar-
rowest sense, especially when the doctrinal issues are technical, the
law is detailed, and the political or ideological valence of the issues
is negligible.99 In other areas of law, the focus on the personal
characteristics of the judge, a dimension stressed (and often exag-
gerated) by Jerome Frank, will be highly predictive.100 But in
American constitutional law, the role of ideological attitudes,
politics, culture, and public opinion plays a larger role, whether as
a nonlegal influence on legal decisions, as some would maintain,101
rejecting the common law belief that mere logic would enable the judge to go from a common
law precedent to a new and different application, then few today would disagree. But it is
nevertheless an open empirical question as to the relative roles played by the previous
decisions and current policy in steering the course of legal development.
98. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES (Frederick Schauer ed.,
2011) (emphasizing the way in which litigation strategies emerge from lawyers’ predictions,
and the way in which lawyers’ predictions are often based on factors other than legal
doctrine); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
99. See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 249 (arguing that plain meaning seems to make more of a
difference in technical cases in which the judges, and in particular Supreme Court Justices,
appear to have no or few ideological priors).
100. See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). The role of personal
and psychological characteristics in influencing judicial decisions was emphasized, even before
Frank, in Theodore Schroeder, The Psychologic Study of Judicial Opinion, 6 CALIF. L. REV.
89, 90 (1918).
101. The prominent research by political scientists on the determinants of the Justices’
votes typically distinguishes attitudinal (or ideological) factors from legal ones, but concludes
that the former are more causally important than the latter. See, e.g., SAUL BRENNER &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE ALTERATION OF PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT,
1946-1992, at 70-71 (1995); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 110-14 (2004).
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or whether as simply part of constitutional law itself, as others
would insist.102 
To the extent that this is so, the question then shifts once again,
and it is at this point that we can see that the political, cultural,
ideological, and psychological resonance of the First Amendment,
when coupled with an increasingly receptive doctrinal landscape,
will lead good lawyers to strain to make First Amendment argu-
ments more than they would strain to make arguments based on
other constitutional doctrines or provisions.103 And thus Stevens and
Entertainment Merchants are best understood as simply reinforcing
an existing trend—and making even more plausible, from the per-
spective of the lawyer104—arguments that would not have been
taken seriously a generation ago. The same also holds true when
viewed from the perspective of a judge seeking to avoid reversal or
seeking public, media, or academic approval, for here too the in-
creased resonance of First Amendment arguments will have at least
some influence not only on which arguments are advanced, but also
on which arguments are accepted.
The foregoing may well support the possibility that the future
may see increased receptivity to First Amendment-inspired attacks
on securities laws, antitrust laws, consumer protection laws,
pharmaceutical and other product labeling laws, and the speech-
102. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) (understanding law in general and
constitutional law in particular as including a range of considerations that includes political
morality as well as constitutional text and Supreme Court precedents); see also Larry D.
Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 165
(2001) (arguing that constitutional law should be substantially determined in the public and
political arenas); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and the Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 111-12 (2003)
(understanding constitutional law as partly determined and defined by popular culture in the
broadest sense). Thus if law is understood to include political factors rather than being
distinct from them, it is a mistake to describe the factors external to legal doctrine as outside
the law. See Richard Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1408-14 (2012)
(describing as “false” the distinction between law and politics).
103. There are few right-based legal arguments that could not be argued as Ninth
Amendment constitutional claims, but Ninth Amendment arguments are widely dismissed,
see, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Ninth Amendment, in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE
HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 179, 179 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989),
which would lead the good lawyer to avoid such arguments and rely instead on other possible
routes to the same outcome.
104. Or the perspective of a judge seeking to avoid reversal or seeking public, media, or
academic approval. 
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restricting dimensions of the law of procedure and evidence.105 Such
attacks, even in the recent past, and to a great extent still now, have
been perceived as laughable. But laughability, especially in consti-
tutional law, has its cultural, political, ideological, and public
opinion dimensions, as the recent litigation about the Affordable
Care Act has made clear.106 Thus it would be hardly surprising to
see increased judicial receptivity to, and consequent lawyers’
increased use of, arguments premised on the First Amendment
against regulatory regimes only recently thought not to implicate
the First Amendment at all.
CONCLUSION:
THE RISKS OF DOCTRINAL DISTORTION
The goal of this Article is principally descriptive, predictive, and
speculative. But although it has few if any normative or prescriptive
105. See Marla Brooke Tusk, No-Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney Speech,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1202, 1234-35 (2003). Compare Peters, supra note 67, at 711, with
Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 687, 690-91
(1997). There are serious debates about the wisdom and even the constitutionality of no-
citation- and no-precedential-effect rules. See Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent:
Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive Community,
35 IND. L. REV. 399, 401 (2002); see also SCHAUER, supra note 88, at 77-78. However, the claim
that such rules present a free speech problem is a good example of exactly the phenomenon
I discuss here.
106. The phenomenon has been particularly salient recently because throughout both the
initial academic discussions regarding the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act and the
litigation that eventually produced National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), the Commerce Clause arguments against the Act were
largely rejected as frivolous and the Taxing and Spending Clause arguments were almost
completely ignored. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, What Are the Chances that the Courts Will Strike
Down the Individual Mandate?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 22, 2013, 9:49 PM), http://www.
volokh.com/2010/03/22/what-are-the-chances-that-the-courts-will-strike-down-the-individual-
mandate [http://perma.cc/SLG4-VWLW]. There are various hypotheses about why arguments
that were initially so quickly dismissed were eventually not only taken seriously, but
ultimately prevailed (in part), including the influence of prominent lawyers and academics
and the influence of the political debate. And a different hypothesis suggests that there was
less of a change than liberal academics perceived, largely because liberal academics saw the
pre-NFIB v. Sebelius law as expanding federal power more than was actually the case. For
more discussion about how the arguments regarding the constitutionality of the Affordable
Care Act moved from being dismissed as frivolous, to being taken seriously to, (sometimes)
ultimately prevailing, compare David Hyman, Why Did Law Professors Misunderstand the
Lawsuits Against the PPACA?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 805 (2014), with Andrew Koppelman, Did
the Law Professors Blow It in the Health Care Case?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273 (2014).
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pretensions,107 it is worth concluding by recalling Justice Powell’s
warning in his opinion in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association.108
When the coverage of the First Amendment expands, he worried,
there is an increased possibility that, out of necessity, some of the
existing doctrinal tools developed for a smaller area of coverage will
have to be modified, possibly with unfortunate consequences.109
Justice Powell was not completely clear about what he had in mind,
but, for example, we might imagine that existing First Amendment
traditions of nondeference to governmental decision making might
be weakened if that governmental decision making were to include
the content-based decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and the Federal Trade Commission about whether prospectuses
and advertisements, respectively, are potentially misleading. As-
suming as a matter of simple logistical reality that the courts are
not going to review the particular decisions of those agencies about
which prospectuses and advertisements are potentially misleading
with the same degree of scrutiny that appellate courts review com-
mentary found by trial courts to be libelous, or even films found to
be obscene, is there a possibility that the existing requirement of
independent appellate review110 will be weakened?111 Similarly,
assuming that some agencies are, and will continue to be, permitted
to regulate some words on the basis of causal consequences less
clear than those necessary for regulating political speech under
Brandenburg v. Ohio, will Brandenburg’s stringent requirements of
causation, imminence, and explicitness become weaker?112
107. I admit to having expressed misgivings about a First Amendment doctrinal structure
with broad coverage, as opposed to a narrow but strong one in earlier work. See Schauer,
Categories and the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 307; Schauer, Codifying the First
Amendment, supra note 20, at 317; Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the
Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1194-1201 (1988).
108. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
109. Id. at 456 (expressing concern about the process of “dilution” or “devitalization” of the
First Amendment if commercial speech were to be evaluated according to the same standard
used for political or other traditionally-protected speech); see also Victor Brudney, The First
Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1153, 1222-23 (2012).
110. See Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 658 (1989); Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 486 (1984); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 189 (1964); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First
Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 281, 346-47 (2000).
111. See Schauer, supra note 107, at 1195.
112. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). Thus we can assume that the requirement of Central
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I will leave to others or to other occasions the normative argu-
ments about whether the possible consequences just noted would be
for the better or for the worse. It may be, after all, that new doc-
trinal tools—increased complexity in the doctrine, for example,
including but not limited to new levels of scrutiny or new domain-
specific tests—might be developed to deal with some of these issues.
But if the confluence of a number of recent developments are likely
to put increased outward pressure on the coverage of the First
Amendment, then it is important to consider the doctrinal implica-
tions such that increased coverage might produce.
Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980), that a regulation of commercial advertising “directly advance” the state interest
requires a weaker showing of causation than that found in Brandenburg.
